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SYSTEMIC COERCION:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
HOWARD E. ABRAMS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court three terms ago decided
2
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 1 another of the Court's plea bargaining cases.
The decision purported to concern itself with no more than "the course
of conduct engaged in by the prosecutor in [the] case, '3 and the majority would have us believe it merely rejected a due process challenge to
plea bargaining. 4 It stands, I fear, for much more. Plea bargaining
cases often present complex questions allowing no easy answers. Hayes,
though, is different. By refusing to recognize that an extreme difference
in degree can result in a difference in kind, the Court, by intellectual
abstinence, declined to extend the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions5 to criminal procedure, its most natural setting.
* Law clerk to Judge Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., United States Tax Court. J.D.,
Harvard University, 1980; B.A., University of California at Irvine, 1976. The author wishes
to thank Professor Charles R. Nesson, Mr. Hayden J. Trubitt, Mr. George T. Sperm, and Dr.
Leonard S. Abrams for their valuable criticisms of an earlier draft.
1 434 U.S. 357 (1978). Discussions of the decision can be found in Nemerson, Coerive
Sentencing, 64 MINN. L. REV. 669 (1980); Pizzi, ProsecutorialDiscretion, Plea Bargainingand the
Supreme Court's Opinionin Bordenkirherv.Hayes, 6 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 269 (1978); Note, The
Resurrection of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction? A CriticalLook at Maher v.Roe and Bordenkireherv.
Hayes, 7 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 165 (1979).
2 The others are: Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63 (1977); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258
(1973); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968).
3 434 U.S. at 365.
4 Id. at 360, 361, 365. Apparently, they were believed. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term,

92 HARV. L. REV.57, 57-326 (1978) (by omission).
5 The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions was first espoused in Hale, Unconstitutional
Conditions and ConstitutionalRights, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 321 (1935), and has come to stand for

the proposition that "government may not condition the receipt of its benefits upon the nonassertion of constitutional rights." Note, Academic Freedom and FederalRegulation of Universiy
Hiring, 92 HARv. L. Rav. 879, 891-92 (1979). See generaly Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
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Hayes, a twice-convicted felon, had been indicted for uttering a
forged instrument in violation of Kentucky law.6 Hayes retained counsel, who tried to plea bargain with the prosecutor. The prosecutor offered to recommend a sentence of five years imprisonment in exchange
for a guilty plea. But, if Hayes refused to "save the Court the inconvenience and necessity of a trial,"'7 the prosecutor threatened to return to
the grand jury and seek an indictment under an habitual criminal statute.8 The maximum penalty for uttering a forged instrument was ten
years in prison; conviction under the habitual criminal statute would
have subjected Hayes to a mandatory life sentence. 9
Right-ftnvilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968); Note, Another
Look at UnconstitutionalConditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144 (1968) [hereinafterAnother Look]. See
also Note, The Unonstitutionaliy ofPlea Bargaining,83 HARe. L. REv. 1387 (1970) [hereinafter
Unconstitutionality].

The genesis of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions can be traced to McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819). In that case, Chief Justice Marshall invalidated a
state tax which discriminated against the federally chartered Bank of the United States. Correctly perceiving that the effect of the tax would be to destroy the Bank, Chief Justice Marshall enforced the supremacy clause and protected the Bank. He did not, however, base his
decision on the discriminatory nature of the tax, see Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro,
173 U.S. 664 (1899), but instead held that property of the federal government is immune
from state taxation. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 210; see First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax
Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
Chief Justice Marshall's extreme position was hardly essential. The short answer to a
claim that the power to tax is the power to destroy is: "[N]ot. . . while [the Supreme] Court
sits," it isn't! Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting), quotedwith approval, Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466,
490 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); accord, Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331
(1886) ("The power to tax is not the power to destroy. . . 2). His overbroad opinion can

perhaps be explained by his appreciation of the difficulty in drawing the line between a
state's reasonable use of its taxing power, and an abusive, unreasonable use. See McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 209-10. That is in essence the line in the field of unconstitutional conditions that the courts have as yet been unable to trace. See also Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926); Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189 U.S. 420
(1903).
6 Ky. REv. STAT. § 434.130 (1973) (repealed 1977), now id. §§ 514.040, 516.060 (Supp.
1977).
7 434 U.S. at 358 n.1.
8 KY. REV. STAT. § 431.190 (1973) (repealed 1977, current version id. § 532.080 (Supp.
1977)), providing a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. The habitual criminal statute under which Hayes was sentenced was unusually harsh. Cf., e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN.
ch. 279, § 25 (West 1972) (mandatory maximum term for offense then at issue); N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 70.02-.10 (McKinney Supp. 1978) (maximum penalty graded by nature of offense).
The prosecutor's timing in Hayes causes problems of its own. In Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21, the Court held that a prosecutor cannot reindict on a felony charge a convicted
misdemeanant who exercises a statutory right to obtain a trial de now. There seems to be little
difference between demanding such a new trial and Hayes' demand for a first trial. See
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 366-68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
9 434 U.S. at 358-59. Hayes' two prior felonies were: (1) detaining a female, committed
at age 17 and for which Hayes was placed in a state reformatory for five years, and (2)
robbery, for which he was sentenced to five years imprisonment though placed on parole
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Hayes rejected the "bargain," was convicted of both charges, and
sentenced to life in prison. His convictions were sustained by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, 10 and a collateral attack was summarily rejected by the federal district court." The Sixth Circuit reversed,
ordering that Hayes be discharged "except for his confinement under a
lawful sentence imposed solely for the crime of uttering a forged instrument. "12 The court reasoned that since the prosecutor originally did not
ask for an indictment under the habitual criminal statute, he had determined that the state had no interest to so charge. Thus, the prosecutor
returned to the grand jury solely to punish Hayes for rejecting the offered plea agreement. To repudiate such prosecutorial vindictiveness,
13
the Sixth Circuit reversed.
The Supreme Court overruled the circuit court and sustained both
convictions. Both the majority and dissenting opinions framed their arguments in terms of prosecutorial vindictiveness-the dissenters 14 found
it, while the majority thought it lacking. The Court's language, however, is misleading. Neither the majority nor the dissenters suggested
that the prosecutor was motivated by personal animosity for Hayes.
Rather, the Court divided over whether a prosecutor violates due process when his charging decision is intended to discourage a defendant
from exercising his constitutional right to trial. 5 Prosecutorial vindictiveness in this sense describes a series of actions taken by the prosecutor
qua prosecutor to strengthen his plea bargaining position.
All of the states and the federal government have either passively
accepted or actively encouraged plea bargaining, 16 knowing that prosecutors are under extreme pressure to produce high conviction rates.
Legislative acceptance of plea bargaining is thus tantamount to mandating the practice.' 7 Though the majority opinion purported to deal
immediately. Id. at 359 n.3. The "forged instrument" was a bad check in the amount of
$88.30. Id. at 358.
10 The opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals is unpublished. See id. at 359.
11 See Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 43 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
12 Id. at 45.
13 Id. at 44-45.
14 Justice Blackmun was joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Justice
Powell wrote his own dissenting opinion.
15 Compare 434 U.S. at 362-65 with id. at 367 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) and id. at 373
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("Implementation of a strategy calculated solely to deter the exercise
of constitutional rights is not a constitutionally permissible exercise of discretion.").
16 Set, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 24.5-26.1 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 119.25 (West Supp. 1975).
17 In addition, a prosecutor may feel compelled to plea bargain because he perceives injustice in the laws-he sees that legislatures have overcriminalized much conduct, and so he
"comes to believe that it is his professional responsibility to develop standards that distinguish
among defendants and lead to equitable dispositions." M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 109

1981]

SYSTEMIC COERCION

only with "the course of conduct engaged in by the prosecutor in [the]
case,' 8 it in fact involved a legislative decision to encourage the waiver
of constitutional rights. 19
At least since 1926, the Supreme Court has been wary of state attempts to frustrate federal statutory or constitutional protections by conditioning receipt of a privilege upon the waiver of a statutory or
constitutional right.20 One state, antagonistic to the federal courts, conditioned a foreign corporation's privilege to do business within the state
21
upon a waiver of its right to remove state actions to the federal courts.
Similarly, New York has attempted to circumvent the fourth amendment by conditioning the receipt of welfare benefits upon the "volun22
tary" waiver of one's right to be free from government searches.
The Supreme Court has attempted to resolve these cases by determining whether the condition unduly burdens the constitutional right,
or whether it is reasonable, and therefore constitutional. In the two situ(1978). See also D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE

WITHOUT TRIAL 131-96 (1966).

The consequence of any substantial increase in the cost of the criminal justice system is
to place more pressure on police officers and prosecutors to curtail the flow of persons into the
formal criminal justice system. Although the extent to which institutional pressure influences
plea bargaining is unclear, compare M. HEUMANN, supra, at 119, with iadat 27-33, interviews
with prosecutors show that their perceived potential backlog is the paramount justification
for maintained plea bargaining. Id. at 114-17. A consequence is a resort to more infbrmal
techniques to achieve what is now accomplished by the adjudicatory process. These informal
techniques--the police officer's occasional stem warning instead of an arrest, the prosecutor's
unexplained decision not to prosecute-are unconstrained by procedural protections and judicial review, see Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). The result is less accountability and more selective enforcement of the laws. "Where law ends, discretion begins," K.
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 3 (1976), discretion which undercuts our conception of the

rule of law as justice defined by and enforced through general and impartial laws. Id.; Vorenberg, Narrowingthe Discretion ofCrimina/JusticeOjiials, 1976 DUKE L.J. 651; Wyzanski, Constitutiona/ism: Limitation and Ajimation, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW 473, 482-83 (A.

Sutherland ed. 1956). However, procedural justice often means slow motion justice, and slow
motion justice is no justice at all. See W. SEYMOUR, JR., WHY JUSTICE FAILS 78-81, 87-88
(1973).

18 434 U.S. at 365.
19 Much of the following will apply mutatismutandis to a larger class of rights, which may
conveniently be labeled "protected" rights. They comprise all rights beyond the control of
the sovereignty under discussion. In a federal context, protected rights are no more than
those rights "implicit or explicit" in the Constitution. San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). In a state context, protected rights include not only
constitutional rights (both national and the state), but also those created by federal legislation. U.S. CONST. art. VI, 1 2; see, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Nash v.
Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967); Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967).
The seminal case is McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 159.
20 Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583; Terra v. Burke Constr.
Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922).
21 ARK. STAT. ANN. ch. xxxi, art. 1, § 824 (Castle 1911).
22 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 134 (McKinney 1976); 18 N.Y. CODE RUL.ES & REGs.§ 351.21
(1979).
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ations above the Court invalidated the former, 23 yet sustained the latter.2 4 To date, the Court has not formulated or consistently applied a
coherent theory of unconstitutional conditions analysis. 25 This inability
to articulate the boundaries of a reasonable condition-sometimes
claiming that no condition may ever be reasonable 2 6-- has left the lower
courts to reconcile inconsistent holdings and produced myriad rationales
and resolutions.
The rights of felons charged with serious crimes provide an apt setting in which to formulate a theory of unconstitutional conditions. The
courts have been especially solicitous in observing these rights, recognizing that deprivation of liberty and imposition of a criminal stigma is
unjustified unless a defendant receives every opportunity to avoid an
improper conviction. 27 Any attempt to elicit a waiver of these fundamental rights by punishing those who assert them is antithetical to the
28
premises of our criminal justice system.
On the other hand, recent decisions have constitutionalized and ex23 Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529.
24 Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
25 Compare Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), with Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47
(1977); compare United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), with Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742.
26 E.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v.
Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. at 598; Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. at 532-33; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas rx rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1910).
27 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373
U.S. 341, 366 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
28 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 758; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,
347 (1943).
A defendant's waiver of his constitutional protections also undermines the normative
aspect of the criminal sanction, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 55-56, 84-87 (1961),
by refuting our shared belief that the criminal stigma may not be applied until the state
proves its case by the most stringent level of proof to the satisfaction of twelve randomly
chosen and impartial jurors. As the Court in Wizship explained:
It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is. . .important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.
397 U.S. at 364. Cf ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY, Canon 7, EC 7-20
("[O]ur adjudicative process requires an informed, impartial tribunal capable of administeringjustice. . . according to procedures.. . that command public confidence and respect.").
Moreover, the formal adjudicatory criminal process helps legitimize verdicts by insulating
them from public criticism. See Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and PraissiveInferences.- The Value of
Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1187, 1194-99 (1979).
Although there have been calls to treat a criminal defendant's rights as unwaivable,
Griffiths, Ideology in Cn'minal Procedure or A Third "Model" of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J.
359, 397 & n.134 (1970), and numerous authors have observed that the absence of formal
processes results in an absence of accountability, see, e.g., K. DAvIs, supra note 17; Vorenberg,
supra note 17, the courts will nevertheless honor a defendant's voluntary and intelligent
waiver. See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
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panded the rights of criminal defendants to the point where if one in five
defendants demanded all such rights, our criminal justice resources
would be exhausted. 29 Our formal, elaborate criminal adjudicatory
process is perceived as inadequate for use by more than a small percentage of those charged with crimes. 30 Most defendants must be persuaded
to waive their rights, and the only way to elicit a waiver from a rational
defendant is make it in his interest not to assert his rights.
Both one's natural predisposition against imposing conditions upon
the exercise of constitutional rights as well as the need for those rights
are highlighted in the context of criminal rights, and plea bargaining is
the paradigmatic problem. Hayes was a student's delight, displaying the
issues with microscopic clarity. However, the majority opinion was
founded on improper analysis and couched in ill-chosen terms, leaving
the legitimate scope of plea bargaining essentially uncharted.
Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court in Hayes acknowledged that
"for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is
to penalize a person's reliance on his legal rights is 'patently unconstitutional.' ",3' This view appears incompatible with plea bargaining, which
the Court had recognized has a "discouraging effect on [a] defendant's
assertion of his trial rights."'32 Nevertheless, the two can be reconciled if
either (i) plea bargaining does not have the objective of discouraging the
assertion of constitutional rights, but merely produces that result, or (ii)
it does not penalize the defendant who asserts his right to trial, but rewards the defendant who waives it.
In Hayes, the Court explicitly focused on the latter explanation,
finding that "in the 'give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no such
element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to
accept or reject the prosecution's offer."3 3 Hayes, the Court suggested,
merely reaffirmed that "the advantages [accruing to a criminal defendant] of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious
29 Plea bargaining rates are estimated at over 90%. See M. HEUMANN, supra note 17, at 1
n.2; Finkelstein, A StatisticalAnaysir of Guilty Plea Practicesin the Federal Courts, 89 HARv. L.
REV. 293 (1975). The Supreme Court has characterized plea bargaining as "essential,"
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 260, although the empirical studies do not support that
conclusion. See, e.g., Rubinstein & White, Alaska's Ban On Plea Bargaining, 13 LAw & Soc'y
REV.367 (1979); Note, The EliminationofPlea Bargainingin Black Hawk County: A CaseStudy, 60
IOWA L. REV. 1053 (1975).
30 See M. HEUMANN, supra note 17, at 114-17; F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DE ISION
TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 191-92 (1969); D. NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 3-4;
Note, Plea Bargainingandthe Transformation ofthe CriminalProcess, 90 HARv. L. R.v.564, 566-67
& nn.18-23 (1977).
3t 434 U.S. at 363; accord, United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
32 Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973).
33 434 U.S. at 363.
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. ... , The defendant was offered a benefit in exchange for his plea;
he was not penalized when he demanded trial.
The Supreme Court's fixation on Hayes' freedom to accept or reject
the prosecutor's proposal was misguided. Of course Hayes could have
limited his sentence by pleading guilty. He had a choice: either exercise
his right to a jury trial, or guarantee the lesser sentence. The crux of the
case was whether Hayes could be put to such a choice. 35 Hayes' dilemma was entirely state created-there is no reason why length of sentence and insistence on constitutional protections must be
interdependent. Kentucky chose to make them so, and the Supreme
Court failed to face the question of whether it had the power to do so.
"Systemic coercion" refers to a legislature conditioning the assertion of a criminal defendant's guaranteed rights upon the waiver of
some state-created privilege. In Hayes, the reduced sentence was only
available if Hayes forfeited his right to trial. Similarly, New Jersey law
once denied the privilege of state employment to anyone who refused to
waive his fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself when offi36
cially questioned about his employment.
The effect of systemic coercion is to force its victim to choose between two desirable options. Neither option is denied, but each is burdened, since the selection of one forecloses the other. If a defendant
chooses to waive the constitutional right, he may claim that he was denied a constitutional guarantee. That is, he will argue that his waiver
should be deemed invalid because it was made to avoid assertedly im37
permissible punishment.
To be valid, a waiver of a constitutional right must be both intelligently and voluntarily made. 38 One necessary condition for a voluntary
waiver is that it be the product of a reasoned, rational mind. 39 Thus,
waivers induced by torture have easily been invalidated. 40 Courts will
34 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 752.
35 "It always is for the interest of a party under duress to choose the lesser of two evils.
But the fact that a choice was made according to interest does not exclude duress. It is the
characteristic of duress properly so called." Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918) (Holmes, J.); see Unconstitutionality, supra note 5, at 1396.
36 N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:81-17.1 (Supp. 1965) (repealed 1970).

37 See, e.g., Jurisdictional Statement at 10-11, Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
38 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966); see
Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941). A waiver is made intelligently if the defendant
is aware of his options and their consequences. For example, a defendant cannot validly
consent to interrogation unless informed of his right to counsel and his privilege against selfincrimination. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Similarly, a guilty plea cannot
intelligently be tendered unless the charge and maximum penalty are known. Se, e.g.,
Robinson v. United States, 474 F.2d 1085 (10th Cir. 1973).
39 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 748.
40 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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examine the totality of circumstances to determine voluntariness in this
sense, 4 1 and have ruled waivers involuntary when induced in part by
43
sickness 42 or extensive questioning.
That a defendant rationally chose between available alternatives
does not establish voluntariness. The Court has long recognized that a
choice is not voluntary merely because the actor was free from "the
more obvious and oppressive forms of physical coercion." 44 Whenever a
defendant waives a constitutional right to avoid an unpleasant result, a
court must determine whether that waiver was "induced by promises or
'45
threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act."
41 See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503,513 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568 (1961) (plurality opinion); State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 128 N.W.2d 645 (1964).
42 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
43 Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949) (plurality opinion, eight-to-one decision).
44 Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. at 803 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); cf.
14 C.J.S. Coercion, at 1307 (1939) ("[C]oercion exists where one is, by the unlawful conduct of
another, induced to do or perform some act under circumstances which deprive him of the
exercise of his free will."); WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 217 (1973) (coerce:
"to restrain or dominate by nullifying individual will."). See generally Dix, Waiver in Crim6nal
Procedure: Brieffor More CarefulAnaysis, 55 TEx. L. REV. 193 (1977).
Professor Fletcher's discussion of involuntary choices is illuminating, see G. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.3.1 (1978), and compare J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINAL LAW 111-13 (2d ed. 1960). See aso Queen v. Dudley, [1884] 14 Q.B. 273.
The Supreme Court has gone so far as to say that a defendant's decision not to appeal his
life sentence when faced with fear of death following reconviction is not an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment" of his right to appeal. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Does that mean such fear "coerced" the defendant
into not appealing? Apparently not. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). See generaly Comment, 47 DEN. L.J. 540 (1970).
It has been held that fear of impeachment by prior conviction impermissibly coerces
defendants into waiving their right to testify in their own behalf. State v. Santiago, 53 Haw.
254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971); see Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933); Nash v.
United States, 54 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932) (L. Hand, J.). To date,
the federal courts have gone only part way. See Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); FED. R. EvID. 609(a); McGowan, Impeachment of CnminalDfendantr hy Prior Conviclion, 1970 LAW & Soc. ORD. 1.
45 Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); accord, Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. at 802 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Shelton v. United States, 246
F.2d 571, 575 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev'd on confession of error
by solicitorgeneral, 356 U.S. 26
(per curiam) (a plea of guilty may not stand if "induced by threats . . . or perhaps by
promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business. . . 2"), quoted with apfproval, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 755; see, e.g.,
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (per curiam); Brain v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). Cf.Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (testimony of defendant needed to establish standing to invoke fourth amendment protection may
not be used by prosecution at trial); State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977)
(answers given to probation officer may not be used at trial).
Justice Harlan (the younger) apparently believed that there is a distinction between
waivers "involuntary as a matter of fact" and involuntary ("inadmissible") as a matter of law.
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 501 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The distinction
urged is this: a waiver involuntary "in fact" is the product of an irrational mind, or an
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On the other hand, if a defendant asserts his constitutional rights,
the question arises whether a state may "punish" him by denying him
some benefit otherwise available. These questions are complementary
in that they represent the two horns of a single systemic coercion dilemma. Surely, a state may inform a defendant of the consequences of
his decision, and any choice predicated upon such information cannot
be involuntary. 46 On the other hand, a waiver induced by fear of an
impermissible penalty-consequences threatened but which cannot lawfully be imposed-just as clearly cannot be sustained. In short: .fa defendant 'sforcedto choose between the assertion ofr'ght A and receipt ofbenefit B,
then an intelligent and rationalwaiver of A is voluntay andhence valid ifand onl
ifB legitimatelv may be denied to one who refuses to waive A.
It is important to appreciate what this assertion does not signify. It
provides no program for distinguishing permissible systemic coercion
from the impermissible, nor for separating invalid waivers from valid
ones. It does provide that the creation of a systemically coercive situation is what must be judged-the dilemma is or is not permissible. The
forced choosing, and not any particular choice, must command our attention.
Systemic coercion cases should most naturally focus on the equal
protection clause. However, current equal protection doctrine is too
coarse to resolve the systemic coercion issues, and so the inquiry shifts to
the motivation behind any challenged practice. Although a motivational test has some applicability, it too is insufficiently sensitive to resolve most systemic coercion cases. The answer I propose is to employ a
normative theory of analysis which both accords with the language used
by the Supreme Court in its systemic coercion cases and is capable of
eliminating most improper systemic coercion. While a normative theory
fails to resolve a few types of cases, it is quite capable of resolving the
issues posed by most instances of systemic coercion.
irrational fear; a waiver induced by the threat of an unconstitutional burden is involuntary
merely "as a matter of law."
His distinction seems illusory (the two types of waivers are not "two unruly horses').
The bank president who calmly opens the vault to a masked gunman in fact is acting involuntarily. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 44, § 10.3.2; note 44 supra.
Some help may be gleaned from the invalidation of confessions as being involuntary. See,
e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436; Comment, Developaments in the Law: Confessions, 79
HARv. L. REV. 935 (1966). Since a guilty plea is tantamount to a conviction and "is an
admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge," McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459, 466 (1969), it is more serious than a confession. See Kercheval v. United States, 274
U.S. 220, 223 (1927). Accordingly, the standards relating to guilty pleas should be as least as
strenuous as those for confessions. Arguably, the standards concerning the waiver of any
constitutional right should be the same. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. at 801 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
46 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. at 506-07 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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II.

EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires
that persons similarly situated be similarly treated.4 7 Systemic coercion
by its very nature classifies, and to the class of those who exercise a specified right, denies a certain benefit. Two defendants identical in every
respect save that one demands his constitutional due are thus treated
differently. Equal protection under the laws demands that the govern48
ment justify the disparity.
In most circumstances, the quantum of justification demanded by
the courts is almost insignificant, 49 which is only proper. Classification
is the stuff of legislation, 50 whether it is used for distributing benefits or
burdens. Moreover, classifications are usually predicated upon imperfect generalizations-we rely on them not because they are ideal, but
because they work tolerably well, and life would be impossible without
them. 5 1 So long as the classification can be defended by rational argu52
ment, the courts will honor a legislature's decision.
This deference is owed to a legislature only when there is no reason
to suspect that it is acting improperly. 53 If a classification is drawn on
racial or ethnic lines and forms the basis for disadvantaging a group
traditionally subject to prejudice, a court will sustain it only if a compelling justification exists.5 4 Strict scrutiny is also appropriate whenever a
court suspects that a classification was drawn to further an unconstitutional goal. 55
Where does systemic coercion fit into this scheme? Justice Holmes
advocated subjecting systemic coercion to only the minimum rationality
level of scrutiny. First articulated in 1892 in a systemic coercion setting,5 6 his view surfaced in a variety of contexts, 5 7 and now is known as
47 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
48 See generally Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal 1rtection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.

341 (1949).

49 See, e.g, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348
U.S. 483 (1955).
50 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 658 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 462 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
5' Id.

30-31 (1980); note 49 supra.
See generalyid at 136-47; Ely, LgirlativeandAdminitrative Motivationin ConstitutionalLaw,
79 YALE LJ. 1205 (1970).
54 See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1977); San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17.
55 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
56 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
57 See, e.g., Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 409-13 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189
U.S. 420 (1903); Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), ad sub nom.
Massachusetts v. Davis, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). Cf. State v. Dreyer, 265 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1972)
52 J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUsT
53
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the "Greater Includes the Lesser" theory. Typically Holmesian, it is
pithy and seemingly persuasive. Although it has not been followed by
the courts nor favored by the commentators, it has never been soundly
refuted.
A.

MINIMUM RATIONALITY AND THE "GREATER INCLUDES THE
LESSER" THEORY OF JUSTICE HOLMES

In McAul. v. Mayor of New Bedford,58 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court rejected a challenge to a New Bedford regulation forbidding police officers to solicit funds for political purposes.5 9 Officer McAuliffe breached this regulation and was fired. He protested and took
his appeal to the highest court of the commonwealth. Justice Holmes
wrote for the court:
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for
hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights
of free speech as well as idleness by the implied terms of the contract. The
servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which
are offered him. On the same principle the city may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control. This condition
seems to us reasonable, if that be a question open to revision here.6°
Justice Holmes argued that the greater power to withhold a benefit
entirely necessarily included the lesser power to withhold it unless specified conditions are satisfied. In particular, a victim of systemic coercion
forced to choose between a benefit and a constitutional right is in a better position than if he was denied the benefit in all events, so what is the
61
cause for complaint?
Though commentators have almost unanimously rejected Justice
Holmes' theory, they attack it not so much on its logic as in its application. Tacitly admitting the validity of the syllogism, they attempt to
recharacterize the benefit as a constitutional right. Then, since the Constitution's rights are guaranteed in the conjunctive, they avoid Justice
(statute giving public employees different criminal statute of limitations constitutional because reasonable); Rankin v. Shanker, 23 N.Y.2d 111, 242 N.E.2d 802, 295 N.Y.S.2d 625
(1968) (jury may be denied to public employees and their labor unions in criminal contempt
proceedings).
58 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517.
59 The Supreme Judicial Court recognized that such conduct is protected by the first
amendment. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517 (by implication).
60 Id., 29 N.E. at 517-18; accord, Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
61 We are not prepared to say that it can be coercion to inform a defendant that someone close to him who is guilty of a crime will be brought to book if he does not plead
[guilty]. If a defendant elects to sacrifice himself for such motives, that is his choice
Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795, 798 (1st Cir. 1959); see Shelton v. United States, 246
F.2d 571. But see Worcester v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 713, 718 (Ist Cir. 1966).
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Holmes' analysis by denying that the greater power actually existed. 62
Justice Holmes' argument should be squarely faced. As Professor
Ely has observed, the Constitution identifies few substantive values, instead specifying the processes by which values are to be chosen.6 3 And
he so powerfully argues, the linchpin of our procedure-oriented fundamental law is the guarantee of equal protection.
By demanding that benefits and burdens given to the politically
powerful also be given to all others, the equal protection clause ties together the citizenry's divergent interests. The Constitution does not allocate resources, nor inform the political branches how to do so. It does
require that any allocation agreed upon be fair to all, not merely to
select groups.6 The equal protection requirement, accordingly, is fundamentally irreconcilable with the Greater Includes the Lesser theory:
the right to withhold from all does not afortiori include the power to
withhold from some.
Yet, while the Constitution requires like treatment for similar people, it does not forbid different treatment for dissimilar people. So long
as a legislature is pursuing reasonable goals in a reasonable manner, the
courts may enforce the distinctions among persons which the enacted
statutes inevitably draw. The presumption of legislative regularity and
the minimum rationality level of scrutiny are nothing more than the
65
children of this observation.
However, when there is reason to suspect that a legislature has pursued illegitimate goals, the courts must make further inquiry. While
statutes which disadvantage groups traditionally subject to prejudice are
obvious candidates for additional scrutiny, they are not the only candidates. Classifications which form the basis for denying or severely restricting the exercise of constitutional rights must be suspect, simply
because the rights are constitutional, and any such classification on its
face appears to overlook that fact.6 6 Laws in conflict with the Constitution are invalid and laws seemingly repugnant to it must be, if not automatically invalidated, at least denied the presumption of regularity. It
may be that such a law was not motivated by animosity to the constitu62 See, e.g., Van Aistyne, supra note 5.

On the other hand, some commentators have accepted the "Greater Includes the Lesser"
theory without reservation. Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Aresumptions, and Burden of Proof in the
CriminalLaw, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1345-46 (1979).
63 See J. ELY, supra note 52, at 90-101; Ely, Towarda Representation-ReinforcingMode ofJudicialReview, 37 MD. L. REv. 451, 471-85 (1978).
64 J. ELY, supra note 52, at 74, 79-83.
65 See note 49 sufira.
66 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,336 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,

404 (1963).
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tional right, but a court is obliged to discover, rather than to assume,
that there is some other plausible explanation.
How plausible must that explanation seem, or how compelling
must the classification be? Those questions occupy the rest of this article. The requirement of a plausible explanation for facially invalid discriminatory treatment teaches that systemic coercion, because it appears
to represent an attempt by a legislature to achieve indirectly what it is
constitutionally forbidden to do directly, must be treated as constitutionally suspect. While we yet have no reason to conclude that systemic
coercion is necessarily illegitimate, the Greater Includes the Lesser theory does not provide its justification.
B.

STRICT SCRUTINY AND EQUAL PROTECTION

Dual standards have evolved from equal protection theory. A challenged classification either benefits from the presumption of legislative
regularity and is subject to the minimum rationality level of scrutiny, or
it is suspect and subject to strict scrutiny. In the former case, the classifi-

67
cation inevitably survives, and in the latter, it just as inevitably falls.

When a court strictly scrutinizes a classification, it must decide two independent issues: (1) whether the classification furthers a compelling
governmental interest, and (2) whether the classification is narrow
enough to avoid over and underinclusion.68 Only if a statute survives
both of these tests will it be upheld, and as a statistical matter, any statute's chance of survival is nil.
Because systemic coercion merits more than minimal scrutiny,
courts have applied strict scrutiny. 69 No cases better reflect this intense
examination than Gardnerv. Broderick 70 and Gariy v. NewJersey,7 ' which
together implicitly overrule McAuhfi .
Police officer Gardner was subpoenaed by a grand jury investigating bribery and corruption among police officers. Before his scheduled
appearance, he was advised of his privilege against self-incrimination
and was requested to sign a "waiver of immunity," effectively a waiver
67 See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Tm--Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctz'e on a
Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
68 See Note, EqualProtection: A Closer Look at CloserScrutiny, 76 MICH. L. REV. 771, 813-68
(1978); Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1101-02
(1969).
69 See, e.g., Von Stauffenberg v. Dist. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 459 F.2d 1128,
1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam). At least one commentator has applied equal protection
theory to unconstitutional conditions issues. See Note, supra note 1, at 177-82. Unlike this
article, however, the Note does not address the motivational aspects of equal protection theory.
70 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
71 385 U.S. 493.
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of his fifth amendment rights. He was informed that if he did not sign,

72
he would be automatically discharged pursuant to New York City law.

73
He refused to sign and was fired for that refusal.

Justice Fortas had little difficulty with the case, writing: "[T]he
mandate of the great privilege against self-incrimination does not tolerate the attempt . . . to coerce a waiver of the immunity it confers on

penalty of the loss of employment. '74 His authority for so broad a statement was a "[p]roper regard for the history and meaning of the privilege
against self-incrimination" 7 5 and Garrity v. NewJersq.
Garmiy involved the same choice at issue in Gardner. Garrity was
asked to testify before an agency investigating police misconduct. He
too was informed of his privilege against self-incrimination and was
warned that failure to testify would result in automatic dismissal. Garrity chose to testify. He subsequently was prosecuted for conspiracy to
obstruct the administration of New Jersey's traffic laws, and his state76
ments were admitted into evidence over his objection.
Garity explicitly rejected the McAultfi perspective, stating that
"[t]he question . . . is not cognizable in those terms." 77 Rather, the
question "is whether a State . . . can use the threat of discharge to se-

cure incriminatory evidence against an employee."' 78 In holding that a
state could not, the Court used conclusory, absolutist language: "There
are rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a State may not condition by the exaction of a price."'79 As Garrity could not constitutionally
be forced to choose between retaining his job and asserting his fifth
amendment right, his election was involuntary, and the statements were
inadmissible.8 0
Neither Gary nor Gardner appear to concern the equal protection
clause: neither decision cited it, and neither defendant based his claim
upon it. That is arguable, however, since Garrity reached the Supreme
Court first, and in that case, the defendant arguably waived his fifth
amendment right, the gravamen of his claim was that his waiver was
coerced, and so therefore invalid. Coerced testimony is excluded from
72 See 392 U.S. at 275 n.2.
73 Id. at 275.
74 Id. at 279.
75 Id.
76 385 U.S. at 495. See general1y State v. Holroyd, 44 N.J. 259, 208 A.2d 146 (1965); State
v. Naglee, 44 N.J. 209,207 A.2d 689 (1965), rev'dsub noa. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493.
77 385 U.S. at 499.
78 Id; accord, Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70 (1973); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280
(1968); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (plurality opinion).
79 385 U.S. at 500.
80 But see Nelson v. Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960).
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trial by the due process clause, so the parties and the Court addressed
the issues within that framework. Because systemic coercion dilemmas
must stand or fall as a whole, when the Gary Court invalidated one of
the horns of the McAulzje dilemma, the other was doomed to invalidation.8 1 The defendant in Gardner could thus rely on Gan'y without canvassing the issues anew.
Although these two cases did not purport to rely upon the equal
protection clause, the doctrine they developed accords with modern
equal protection theory. Moreover, if an equal protection issue was
merely latent in the Gamiy decision, it managed to surface in Gardner.
The defendant in Gardner did not assert that a police officer can
never be discharged for refusing to answer his superior's questions. He
argued that the case be decided on a narrower point.
It has been suggested that a public officer has a duty to account to the
state for the conduct of his office, and the failure to do so is insubordination and misconduct. . . . The advance relinquishment of constitutional
82
guarantees is not an essential prerequisite to such duty as may exist.
This compelling state interest exception was presaged by Justice
Fortas in an earlier opinion, 83 and was adopted by the Court in Gardner.
Forced testimony cannot be introduced at trial regardless of any compelling state interest,8 4 but that was not the real issue in Gan'y or Gardner. The Court was asked only to decide when a state may deny
employment to one who insists upon exercising a constitutional right.
Whenever the legitimacy of a denial of benefits to a class of persons is
questioned, the equal protection clause arguably commands the Court
to look to the government's motivation.8 5 To survive equal protection
strict scrutiny, the state must provide a compelling interest necessitating
the classification. Although the opinions contained nebulous due process language, Justice Fortas spoke to equal protection strict scrutiny
analysis: "If appellant . . . had refused to answer questions specifically,
directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his official duties
• . .the privilege against self-incrimination would not have been a bar
86
to his dismissal."
Strict scrutiny protects the integrity of the Constitution's guarantees; at times it protects them too well. Minimum rationality is unsatis81 See text accompanying note 46 supra.
82 Brief for Appellant at 9, Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (emphasis added).
83 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. at 519 (Fortas, J., concurring).
84 See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
85 See J. ELY, supra note 52, at 145-48. Professor Ely notes that "special scrutiny, in particular its demand for an essentially perfect fit, turns out to be a way of 'flushing out' unconstitutional motivation." Id. at 146 (footnote omitted).
86 392 U.S. at 278. See also Note, supra note 1, at 187-98 (applying strict scrutiny to
Bordenkircher v.Hayer).
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factory as the validating test of systemic coercion because it is premised
on an assumption of legislative regularity, an assumption challenged by
the statute itself. Systemic coercion presents a clear opportunity for legislative abuse, 8 7 so a court should convince itself that animosity to a
constitutional right was not the sole animating force behind any statutory coercion. A court, that is, must be persuaded that some legitimate
goal underlay the statute, but it is a long leap from there to conclude
that the court must find a compelling goal. Refusal to presume legislative
regularity hardly suggests that a state should have to establish anything
more than that regularity was actually present. Current equal protection theory, however, either presumes legislative regularity or irregularity. Whomever the burden of persuasion falls upon faces an almost
impossible task. Strict scrutiny invalidates not only the indefensible, but
the merely rational as well.
Imposing the onerous strict scrutiny burden upon the government
sometimes may be appropriate. For example, if a classification disadvantages blacks for no apparent reason, the conclusion is almost inescapable that the legislature was pursuing an unconstitutional goal. So
too, when a legislature gerrymanders electoral districts into multifaceted
polygons, apparently to ensure the party in power remains in power. 88
But systemic coercion is rarely so evident. The next section analyzes
how a court should ascertain a decisionmaker's motivation and suggests
in part that most systemic coercion represents rational attempts to
achieve worthy goals. Even so, systemic coercion does force defendants
to waive their constitutional rights. Section IV faces the difficult question posed when a state can defend systemic coercion by a legitimate but
uncompelling reason.
III.
A.

SYSTEMIC COERCION AND THE SEARCH FOR MOTIVATION

SUBJECTIVE INTENT

"Intent" denotes two distinct concepts. In its first sense ("subjective" intent), it encompasses human desires and goals, and refers to the
mental state of a human being. For example, a baseball batter may in
this sense intend to hit a home run, although the external manifestation
of that intent, the muscular movements in his arms and body, do not
constitute the act of hitting a home run but of swinging a bat. His goal
is not to move a piece of wood through the air in such a fashion as to
contact a thrown baseball-that action is more properly viewed as the
means by which he attempts to achieve his goal. Subjective intent is
87

See C.

DUcAT, MODES OF CONSTrrUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 114 (1978); L. TRIBE,

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 16-10 (1978).

88 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See generally Ely, suira note 53.
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independent of all external reality, except insofar as one attempts to effectuate one's desires.
Any systemic coercion subjectively intended to discourage the assertion of a constitutional right is invalid since dissuading the exercise of
constitutional rights is not a permissible goal of legislation. 9 Yet while
the Court periodically reiterates that legislation "necessarily calculated
to curtail the free exercise" of one or another constitutional right is
void, 90 it has rarely invalidated legislation on a finding of improper motivation.9 ' The reason the Court's practice has not followed its rhetoric
is easy to find; the classic statement is by Chief Justice Warren:
Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter.
When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will
look to statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit to sound decision-making in this circumstance is
thought sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress' purpose.
It is entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is,
under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what
fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What motivates one
legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us
to eschew guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that it
is unwise legislation which Congress had the undoubted power to enact
and which could be reenacted in its exact
form if the same or another
92
legislator made a "wiser" speech about it.
The concerns articulated by Chief Justice Warren are not compromised when a court examines the motivation of individual decisionmakers exercising delegated authority. When a defendant alleges
that executive, administrative, or judicial action has penalized him for
asserting a constitutional right, a court can simply engage in a traditional factfinding inquiry designed to ascertain the decisionmaker's intent. 93 Conceptually, this approach is obvious. As a matter of practice,
it is unsatisfactory.
89 One possible exception is a legislative act premised upon a constitutional grant of
power, and not a grant limited to the attainment of specific ends. The federal commerce
power has been viewed in this light. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (commerce power used to regulate crime); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (commerce power used to prohibit racial discrimination); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964) (same). For a slightly different perspective, see L. TRIBE, supra note 87,
§ 12-5, at 593-94.
90 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 578 (1968); Terral v. Burke Constr. Co.,
257 U.S. at 532.
91 For rare examples, see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103, 107 (1968); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339. See generally Ely, supra note 53.
92 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) (footnote omitted); accord, Palmer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971); Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960).
93 See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Griffin v. County School Bd.,
377 U.S. 218 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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Determining someone's state of mind is no easy task, so the placement of the burden of persuasion may be decisive. One might reasonably shift the inquiry from determining motivation on a case-by-case
basis, instead attempt to isolate situations in which improper motivation
is a significant possibility, and then impose a blanket prophylactic protection.
In North Carolina v. Pearce,94 the Supreme Court adapted this prophylactic approach to the problem of harsher sentences imposed upon
defendants who successfully appeal their convictions and then are reconvicted at retrial. It held that
whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a
new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those
reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable
conduct on the part of the 95
defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.
Pearce gives to each defendant the ability to limit any subsequent
resentencing by controlling his behavior after the first sentencing. 95 Although it was initially understood as speaking to concerns broader than
impermissible motivation, 9 7 the Court now reads Pearce as a prophylactically overbroad ruling justifiable only because there is a significant
possibility that a harsher resentence will be the result of judicial vindictiveness. Consistent with this interpretation of Pearce, the Court has declined to extend it to harsher sentences following trials de nova available
as of right 98 or sentences imposed by juries,99 believing that in such cases
the possibility of an impermissible motivation is either "not inherent"' °°
or "de minimis."10 '
Both the case-by-case and prophylactic approaches are conceptually sound: each represents an attempt to guarantee that systemic coercion that cannot rationally be justified will be avoided.
Unfortunately, both lack much significance as they are inapplicable to
legislative systemic coercion. In the following subsection, I show how a
94 395 U.S. 711 (1969).

95 Id. at 726.
96 See Note, "Upping the Ante" Against the Defendant Who Successfu ly Attackr His Guily Plea:
Double Jeopardy and Due Process Implications, 50 NOTRE DAME LAw. 867 (1975).
97 See Levine v. Peyton, 444 F.2d 525 (4th Cir.), cert. deniedsub noa. Slayton v. Levine, 404
U.S. 995 (1971); Aplin, Sentence Increaseson Retrial After North Carolina v.Pearce, 39 U. CIN. L.
REv. 427 (1970). See also Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 905 (1968). But cf.United States v. Allsup, 573 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 961 (1978) (state may use initially unbrought charges as a bargaining tool).
98 Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104

(1972).
99 Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
100 Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. at 116.

101 Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. at 26.
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different notion of intent allows the courts to apply to legislative decisionmaking an analysis analogous to the one presented above. The flaw
inherent in motivational analysis is present there too: improper motivation is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for invalidating legislation.
Invalidating subjectively improper systemic coercion is no more
controversial-and no more interesting-than validating that necessitated by a compelling governmental interest. Most systemic coercion,
like plea bargaining, is the product of attempts to achieve laudable ends
in reasonable ways. It therefore will satisfy a motivational inquiry. It is
not by that token alone necessarily legitimate, however, for "[t]he existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an im02
permissible effect.'
B.

OBJECTIVE INTENT

"Intent" also embraces a second, objective concept. Objective intent refers to the obvious and inevitable consequences of any human
action. In determining whether one ought to be held civilly liable for
one's conduct, the requirement of intent has come to embody both
meanings. For example, Perkins offers the following formula: "Intent
includes those consequences which (a) represent the very purpose for
which an act is done (regardless of likelihood of occurrence), or (b) are
known to be substantially certain to result (regardless of desire).' 1 3
Perkins' example, based on the definition of intent found in the law
of torts, 10 4 is typical of many codifications in the older state criminal
codes.' 0 5 The Model Penal Code eschews the word "intent," but nevertheless incorporates both forms into its scheme of mental states which
determine culpability. It defines a person to be actingpurpose'y when
pursuing his subjective intentions, and acting knowingly when accomplishing his objective intentions.106
102 Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451,462 (1972); accord, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
103 R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 658 (1957).
104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
105 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-203(B)(2) (1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3201 (1974); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-10, 14-11 (West 1974); H. SILVING, CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF
CRIME 207 (1967); see GA. CODE § 26-604 (1978); WIs. STAT. § 939.23 (1975).
106 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (a), (b) (proposed official draft 1962); accord, ALA. CODE
tit. 13A, § 2-2 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-203 (1977); CAL- PENAL CODE § 7 (Deering

1971); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-501 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-3 (1979); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 231 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 702-206 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 18-101
(1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 4-4, 4-5 (1980); IND. CODE § 35-41-2-2 (1979); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 501.020 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-10, 14-11 (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 10 (Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. § 609.02 (1976); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.016
(Vernon 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. tit. 94, § 2-101 (Supp. 1974); N.Y. PENAL LAW
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The concept of objective intent can be traced to Austin, who believed that "[t]o expect any of [an act's] consequences, is to intend those
consequences .... ,"107 Although objective intent can be thought of as
a purely mental state (the state of expectation), a litigant will have difficulty convincing a jury that he did not expect the obvious and inevitable consequences of his actions.
It is convenient to distinguish between two situations, "class (1)"
and "class (2)." Suppose that a legislature passes a statute which has
two consequences, X and Y. If achieving X was the subjective intent of
all the legislators, X may rightly be treated as the goal of the statute.
Then, either of two possibilities is true: (1) there is a way to accomplish
X without also achieving Y; or (2) there is no way to accomplish X
without Y. We can define class (1) by stating that Y is unnecessary to X,
and class (2) by stating that Y is necessary to X. Our baseball batter
example falls within the second class because swinging a bat is necessary
to hitting a home run. However, if the batter's desire had been merely
to play some sport, swinging a bat would fall into the first category. 0 8
Class (1): Unnecessay Systemic Coercion
When Y is unnecessary to X (class (1)), one should treat both X and
Y as goals of the legislation. By hypothesis, X could have been obtained
without Y. That the state chose to achieve X in a manner also producing Y should be treated as a deliberate decision to achieve Y. Consequently, whenever systemic coercion is defended as a reasonable attempt
to achieve a permissible goal, the defense must fail if the asserted goal
could be achieved without the systemic coercion. Moreover, legislative
intent is primarily determined by the plain meaning of the words of the
statute, 10 9 so an exhaustive set of possible candidates for X should be
available from the face of the statute.
In United States v. Jackson,110 the Court faced what it perceived to be
a class (1) case. Jackson challenged the sentencing provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act, which provided that a convicted defendant could
be sentenced to no more than life imprisonment unless the jury recom§ 15.05 (McKinney 1975); N.D. CErr. CODE § 12.1-02-02 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2901.22 (Page 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085 (1972); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302
(Purdon 1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-1-2 (1978); TZx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2,

§ 6.03 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103 (1978).
107 1 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 433-34 (4th ed. 1879). See general4', J.
HALL, supa note 44, at 108-17.
108 But see Hart, Acts of Will andRespnsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 101-04
(1968).
109 See Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 65 (1958); Richmond Welfare Rights Organization v. Snodgrass, 525 F.2d 197, 202 (9th Cir. 1975).
t1o 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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mended death.'
The statute allowed a defendant to limit his maximum penalty either by pleading guilty, or, with the court's permission,
by pleading not guilty and waiving a jury. As the Court noted: "The
inevitable effect of any such provision is, of course, to discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial." 112 The
government argued that the object of the penalty provision was to
"ameliorat[e] the severity of the more extreme punishment that Congress might have wished to provide." 113 Congress might have felt that
kidnapping merits a death sentence, yet was reluctant to impose so drastic a judgment absent a concurrence by a sample of the community.
From this perspective, the effect of "inducing defendants not to contest
11 4
in full measure" was merely incidental.
The Supreme Court's reply was succinct. Assuming arguendo the
state's benign motivation, the Court nevertheless wrote: "Whatever
might be said of Congress' objectives, they cannot be pursued by means
that needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights. . . . The
question is not whether the chilling effect is 'incidental' rather than intentional; the question is whether that effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive."1 5 Noting that uniformly empaneling a sentencing jury
would eliminate the statute's failings, 116 the Court had no difficulty
voiding the sentencing scheme.
Although the Jackson result seems correct, the Court's rationale is
problematic. If by "unnecessary" the Court meant that there was another way to further the state's goal as efficiently as the challenged
scheme, then it was incorrect. The Court's proposed alternative was
considerably more expensive than the voided alternative. More plausibly, the Court might have meant that administrative efficiency and cost
effectiveness should play no role in determining what is necessary to further state aims and that cost considerations are not sufficiently impor1 17
tant to justify interference with the exercise of constitutional rights.
111 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1966), lateramended by Pub. L. No. 92-539, 86 Stat. 1070 (1972),
provided:
Whoever knowingly transports. . . any person who has been unlawfully seized. . . and
held for ransom. . . shall be punished (I) by death if the kidnapped person has not been
liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed.
112 390 U.S. at 581 (footnote omitted).
113 Id. at 582.
114 Id.
"15

Id.

116 See, e.g.,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2310 (1975)

(jury empaneled to fix penalty following

plea of guilty).
117 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972); accord, Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123, 134-35 (1968); see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
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However, if cost is of no concern, then the Court is on a slippery
slope indeed. Few aspects of any criminal justice system cannot be
made more favorable to defendants and their constitutional rights if cost
were irrelevant. Free counsel, sufficient courts to ensure speedy trials,
and prison child care centers spring to mind-the possibilities are endless. One interpretation of "necessary" has no effect, and the other has
too much." 8 The Court did not suggest-nor is it apparent-where to
draw the line.
Additionally, if the state had argued that the purpose of the statute
was to facilitate plea bargaining, the sentencing provision would have
been essential to the purpose of the Act. Such a defense would have
shifted the statute from class (1) into class (2), rendering it immune to a
motivational attack.'19
As characterized by the Court,Jackson represents a rare case indeed: one in which the systemic coercion was purely incidental and unrelated to the legitimate goals of the legislature. If improperly
motivated systemic coercion, whether subjective or objective, were not
uncommon, the subject would lack interest. However, most systemic coercion is neither improperly subjectively motivated nor merely incidental to another legitimate goal, but rather the coercion itself forms the
only reasonable attempt to effectuate the state's desires. That case forms
the crux of the issue, and is treated below.
Class (2): Necessay Systemic Coercion
Class (2) systemic coercion encompasses reasonable attempts by legislators to achieve legitimate goals which cannot be attained without
discouraging the assertion of constitutional rights. It suffers from the
same disability as does systemic coercion enforced by an individual (e.g.,
a judge), which is properly motivated. There is no easy way to validate
it or to strike it down. Both forms of systemic coercion can be rationally
defended and current constitutional doctrine does not specify whether
that level of defense is enough.
The Supreme Court has identified two modes of analysis for dissecting class (2) cases, and has hinted at a third. The remainder of this
section argues against the two theories, and then suggests that the
Court's hint, if properly developed, can assist in rationalizing the systemic coercion field.
A BalancingApproach. One way for the Court to respond to a sys118 See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Balancing in First
Amendment Analvsis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1484-90 & n.29 (1975).
119 Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, was just such a case.
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temic coercion challenge is to balance the incremental costs to individuals against the potential state benefits. This approach appears
reasonable: it represents in a poorly defined way an attempt to determine whether the benefits flowing from any particular instance of systemic coercion are worth the concomitant costs. 120 The problem is that

it ispoorly defined, and places the judiciary in the uncomfortable position of deciding difficult cases without the guidance of meaningful standards.
Balancing may be appropriate when applying broadly worded constitutional clauses. Beyond the interpretive stage, though, it has no
place. 121 To deny an individual an unencumbered opportunity to assert
his constitutional rights because of some diffuse governmental interest is
judicial abdication, not constitutional interpretation. As Justice Black
so long maintained 22 and as the commentators are beginning to
agree, 123 case-by-case balancing legitimizes majoritarian tyranny since a
124
collective interest always seems to outweigh individual needs.
Criticism of adhoc judicial balancing is common, and often reflects
a belief that balancing is incompatible with the proper judicial role.
Glass (2) systemic coercion presents hard cases, but that does not justify
allowing judges to decide them as they please, as condoned by qualitative balancing. To the extent that one perceives the judicial role as applying general legal rules to sets of particular facts, adhoc balancing as a
judicial methodology refutes that perception.
In the context of systemic coercion, adhoc balancing is particularly
unsatisfactory. The Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution to protect individual liberties from an overzealous government. The rights to
trial by jury, to confront one's accusers, and to refuse to testify against
120 See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961). See also Dix, supra note 44,
at 249; Scanlon, A Theog of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 204, 222 (1972)
Another Look, supra note 5, at 181.

121 See Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to lime: FirstAmendment Theo,7 Applied to Libel
and Miapplied to Pr'vay, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 942 (1968).
122 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. at 61 (Black, J., dissenting); H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1969); Decker,JusticeHugo L Black: The Balancerof Absolutes, 59 CALIF.
L. REV. 1335 (1971); Freund, Mr. Justice Black and theJudicialFunction, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
467 (1967);Justice Black andFirstAmendment "Absolutes':" A PublicInterview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV.

549 (1962).

123 See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 121.
124 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 144 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); see Nimmer, supra note 121, at 939-42. See generally C. DUCAT, supra note 87, at 95-100, 116-92.
Almost forty years ago, Dean Pound observed:
When it comes to weighing or valuing claims or demands, we must be careful to compare
them on the same plane. If we put one as an individual interest and the other as a social
interest, we may decide the question in advance in our very way of putting it.
R. POUND, A SURVEY OF SOCIAL INTERESTS 2 (1943), reprinted in 3 JURISPRUDENCE 329
(1959), quotedin C. DUCAT, supra note 87, at 181.
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oneself were not enshrined as the supreme law of the land because of a
fear that a legislature would abolish them on a whimsy, or out of raw
tyranny. They were adopted because they were thought to be so important that they should not be denied even if a legislature thinks there is a
good reason for doing so. They represent checks upon government benefiting each individual who elects to exercise them. Thus it is particularly inappropriate to diminish their availability in the name of the
public weal.
An HistoricalApproach. Another possibility is to look to long-standing practices or Anglo-American traditions to set the relevant standards.
Surprisingly, such an approach need not be static. That state after state
abolishes a once prevalent form of systemic coercion may justify abolition of the practice in those few anachronistic jurisdictions standing fast.
Similar methods have long been advocated as the proper way to interpret the eighth amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punish25
ments."1
Nevertheless, this historical approach is as unsatisfactory as the ad
hoc balancing approach discussed above. The inconclusive debate on
whether the fourteenth amendment's due process clause was intended to
incorporate the Bill of Rights shows how ambiguous history may be on
even the simplest of issues. 126 Justice Harlan's opinions defining fundamental fairness in terms of an historical understanding and overwhelming community sentiment show that these standards change not so much
27
with the times, but with each appointment to the bench.
In addition, using contemporary legislative practice as evidence of
reasonableness is letting the fox guard the hens; after all, class (2) systemic coercion is predicated upon a legislative decision to discourage the
assertion of a constitutional right. Perhaps more important, systemic
coercion does not lend itself to an historical or community sentiment
approach as does the eighth amendment. What constitutes a cruel punishment does seem to turn on a community's values, and rightly it could
vary between peoples or across time. Whether a legislature may do indirectly that which it is prohibited from doing directly is not as ephemeral
a question. It should be attacked from a more reasoned and less pragmatic vantage.
125 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910); see Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 1144 (1980).
126 Compare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 92-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) with
Fairman, Does the FourteenthAmanment Incorporatethe BillofRights? The On'ginalUnderstanding, 2
STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
127 &e McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 209-220 (1971); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. at 506-26 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14-33 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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A Nomalive Approach. In Griffin v. Califom'a,128 the Supreme Court
invalidated the California "comment rule" which provided that "in any
criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case
against him may be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and
129
may be considered by the court or jury."'
Justice Douglas' brief opinion condemned the rule for creating "a
penalty . . for exercising a constitutional privilege." 130 His stark conclusion was juxtaposed between the observations that (i) the inference of
guilt drawn from a refusal to testify "is not always so natural or irresistible,"' 13 1 and (ii) the practice was a "remnant of the 'inquisitorial system
of criminal justice.' "132
In painful contrast to the opinion of Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court, which it overruled, 133 Griftn contained scant analysis. No equal protection or motivational analysis was attempted. The
Court merely held that the comment rule violated the fifth amendment's guarantee that "[n]o person. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .

-"134

Yet, California's comment rule compelled nothing. 135 The only
strength in the opinion lies in its characterization of the rule as a penalty. However, the Court gave no clue suggesting how it made that
characterization. In fact, the Court routinely refers to impermissible
systemic coercion as imposing penalties upon the assertion of constitutional rights, 136 in apparent accordance with the notion that one may
only be penalized for doing something wrong, not for demanding one's
constitutional rights.
128 380 U.S. 609 (1965). For a similar criticism of Grifti, see Ayer, The Fi/th Amendment and
the Inference of Guiltfrom Silence: Grifi v.CalomiaAfter Fi/?een Years, 78 MicH. L. REV. 841,
853-55 (1980).
129 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13, T 7 (1934) (repealed 1974).
130 380 U.S. at 614. The full quotation is: "It is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a
constitutional privilege." (emphasis added). The italicized portion makes no sense at all,
since the California comment rule was a part of the state's constitution, inserted as a senate
amendment. Barr, PrivilegesAgainst Self-Incrimination in California, 30 CALiF.L. REV. 547, 549
& n.16 (1942).
131 380 U.S. at 615.
132 Id. at 614.
133 People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 398 P.2d 753, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1965).
134 380 U.S. at 609.
135 See id. at 617-23 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398
(1970); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925); Brunk, The Problem of oluntarinessand
Coercion in the NegotiatedPlea, 13 LAw & Soc. REv. 527 (1979). But see Nesson, supra note 28,
at 1203-13.
136 See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. at 24;
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. at 116; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742; United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. at 582-83.
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"Penalty" need not function merely as a conclusory label. It embodies a normative concept.' 3 7 If it can be tied to an independently
defined referent, it can provide the basis for distinguishing legitimate
systemic coercion from the illegitimate. One ought not be penalized for
asserting one's rights, but one surely may be rewarded for helping the
state. So long as there is an independent referent, these terms can be
meaningfully defined, and the absence of one will not necessarily imply
the existence of the other.
Systemic coercion fits nicely within a penalty and reward framework. A defendant has a choice: either assert or waive some constitutional right. Each option corresponds to a separate outcome, and
waiver results in a more pleasant consequence than assertion. The defendant naturally enough alleges that the dilemma penalizes the exercise of his constitutional right, to which the government responds that
the defendant may not benefit from both his waiver and assertion of his
constitutional rights. That is, the government argues that the scheme
merely rewards waivers. In the abstract, it is impossible to tell which of
the parties is correct. Given the facts of a particular case, that is just the
inquiry which a court should make.
While the Supreme Court invariably resorts to normative language
in systemic coercion cases, it fails to pursue the proper inquiry. In Griffin, Justice Douglas cited the appropriate constitutional provision,
quoted the challenged statute, and then announced that the two did not
square, so the statute was struck down. Such result-oriented opinions
may accord with the practice of common law adjudication over the last
several centuries, but they are inappropriate for constitutional adjudication. 3 8
More than any other tribunal, the Supreme Court must be, and
must appear to be, guided by principle. It must be principled because it
writes the fundamental law of our government. It weaves the fabric of
our society. As the design in a piece of cloth can only change by imperceptible increments, so too must constitutional doctrine only slowly
and carefully change directions. The common law "random-walk to
truth" methodology would wreak chaos if followed by a court of last
resort. As the bedrock of our legal infrastructure, the Court's vibrations
reverberate throughout society. It must therefore be "a voice of reason
charged with the creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating
39
and developing impersonal and durable principles."'1
137 See generalto Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD 440 (S.
Morgenbesser, P. Suppes & M. White eds. 1969).
138 See J. ELY, supra note 52, at 67-68.
'39 Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Tem--Forward" The Tme Chart oftheJustices, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 84, 97 (1959) (emphasis in original). See A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH
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The Court must also appear to be principled. The judiciary serves
not only to check the legislatures by invalidating acts repugnant to the
Constitution, but to legitimize those acts it upholds. Through principled decisionmaking removed from the hue and cry of legislative halls,
political logrolling, and public outcry, the courts perform their "mystic"
function of assuring us that our society remains on its charted constitutional course."40 But this mysticism will not survive unless the courts,
especially the Supreme Court, appear to reflect the "sober second
thought" of our collective conscience. The Court must justify its decisions not with transient theories or timely rationalizations, but with values of "more general and permanent interest.''141
The Gifin approach is unsatisfactory because it is purely conclusory. It hides the Court's decisionmaking process, creating instability
and uncertainty in the legal community, and undercutting the moral
force necessary to sustain its legitimizing function. By rendering opin-

ions unsupported by neutral principles, the Supreme Court loses its ability to claim that right reason, rather than force or will, is the source of its
strength and the justification for its power. 142 Hiding analysis behind
the facade of interpretation makes analogies harder to draw and forces
similar cases to appear foreign. Faint lines, particularly the ones distinguishing permissible burdens from impermissible ones, are not illuminated by a Court which tells us on which side of the line a case falls, but
refuses to tell us why.143
The Court has recently reiterated that "not every burden on the
exercise of a constitutional right.

. .

is invalid.' 144 Its justification must

be the belief that "[t]he distinction between [giving] benefits [to one]
and burdens [to another] is more than one of semantics."' 145 Yet, unless
that distinction is securely tied to a normative theory, it ir purely semantic. When faced with systemic coercion, the defendant who waives, gets
more, while the defendant who demands, gets less, each in relation to
the other. There is no way one can meaningfully label one treatment as
punishment or the other as reward absent an independently defined
referent. 14 Until the Court articulates some normative theory or drops
247-51 (1962); Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciples of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REv. I
(1959).
140 C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 56-86 (1960).
141 A. BICKEL, supra note 139, at 24; Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv.
L. REv. 4, 25 (1936).
142 A. BICKEL,supra note 139, at 235-43; THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
143 This concern is, of course, far broader than systemic coercion. See, e.g., Tushnet, Constitutional Limitation of Substantive Criminal Laws An Eamination of the Meaning ofMullanqp v.Wilbur, 55 B.U.L. REv. 775, 802 (1975).
144 Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. at 218.
145 Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 (1977).
146 The courts have tried to define "punishment" in other contexts, notably in respect to
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the penalty and reward distinction, its systemic coercion opinions are
doomed to inconsistency and irrationality. This can only undercut the
Court's legitimizing function in general, and one's faith in the rule of
law, and not of men, in particular.
IV.

A

NORMATIVE THEORY OF SYSTEMIC COERCION

While systemic coercion may not validly penalize those who insist
upon exercising their constitutional rights, it may induce waivers
favorable to the state by rewarding those who forego their entitlements.
The courts must give that distinction content by fleshing out the concept of an independent referent, the definitional linchpin of any normative theory. 147 For some cases, a sufficiently omnipresent norm will
provide an easy answer. For others, there will be no easily identifiable
referent, forcing the courts to either define one themselves or look to
another political branch to do so. Following the lead of Professor Ely, I
propose that the courts not define these bottom-line standards themselves, but use a separation of powers doctrine to ensure that the duty to
make these definitions is properly distributed among the other branches
of the government. 148
challenges based upon the ex post facto and bills of attainder clauses. Seegeneral' Flemming
v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 613-17 (1960). However, in these contexts the distinction drawn is
not between reward and penalty, but between civil and criminal. The discussion presupposes
that someone is being punished, and the question is whether it is ciminal (and thus impermissible) punishment. Cf. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966) (income tax levied
on illegally obtained funds not punishment).
147 Professor Nozick has constructed a similar normative theory, not ofcoercion, but of being
coerced. See Nozick, supra note 137. His shift in emphasis allows him to define punishment
more objectively, but at the cost of overlooking (in what Professor Nozick refers to as a "preliminary" work, id. at 440) the inequity forced upon one who refuses to be coerced and is
therefore doomed to suffer the punishment.
148 Since this theory is not tied to any specific constitutional clause or amendment, one
might argue it lacks a constitutional foundation. Such a criticism misses the mark. The
supremacy clause, coupled with an appreciation of the overall structure of the Constitution
and the federalism which it imposes, imply that a state may not do indirectly that which it
constitutionally is forbidden to do directly.
Professor Charles Black makes this point exceptionally well in his brilliant book, STRUcTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONsTrrUTIONAL LAw (1969). He observes that American constitutional jurisprudence has come to rely almost exclusively on particularized interpretation
as its method of analysis, and argues
that our preference for the particular-text style has been a decided one, leading not only
to the failure to develop a full-bodied case-law of inference from constitutional structure
and relation but even to a preference, among texts, for those which are in form directive
of official conduct, rather than for those that declare or create a relationship out of the
existence of which inference could be drawn.
Id. at 8.
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OMNIPRESENT NORMS---GOVERNMENT AS A MEMBER OF SOCIETY

In 1850, in State v. Wright, 14 9 the Missouri Supreme Court upheld a
jury fee of three dollars taxed against every criminal defendant who demanded a jury and was subsequently convicted. Wright claimed the tax
was repugnant to the Constitution's guarantee "that the right of trial by
jury, shall remain inviolate." 150° The court, though acknowledging "that
right and justice ought to be administered without sale, denial, or delay," 1 5 1 nevertheless wrote: "[W]e do not deem that any of the great
guarantees alluded to have been invaded or violated by the legislation in
question."

15 2

The conventional justification offered in support of taxes such as
those found in Wright is that the state incurs additional costs as a result
of the defendant's demand, hence in fairness the defendant ought to
bear them. The state is not burdening the defendant's right, so the argument goes, because the costs are inherent in the assertion. Empaneling a jury is expensive and the defendant has brought this cost upon
53
himself. 1
This argument confuses an inherent cost occurrence with an inherent
cost allocation. The state, which pays the salaries and related expenses of
the judge, prosecutor, bailiff, and court reporter, is obligated to provide
a jury, and, at least initially, to pay any expenses necessary to achieve
149 13 Mo. 243 (1850); see, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 193 F. 1007 (S.D.NY. 1911);
Conner v. Municipal Court, 145 Colo. 177, 358 P.2d 24 (1960); Saunders v. People, 63 Colo.
241, 165 P. 781 (1917); Adams v. Corriston, 7 Minn. 365 (1862); Shaw v. State, 17 Neb. 334,
22 N.W. 772 (1885); Arnold v. State, 76 Wyo. 445, 306 P.2d 368 (1957); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1918,
1920, 1923 (1966); IDAHO CODE § 19-4703, repealed, 1969 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 139, § 3;
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2537 (1962). See generally Note, Charging Costs ofProsecution to the
Defendant, 59 GEO. L.J. 991 (1971); Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 854 (1959); Annot., 32 A.L.R. 865
(1924).
150 13 Mo. at 244.
151 Id.
152 Id.

153 See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 371 (1971). Cf. Gleckman v. United States, 80 F.2d
394, 403 (8th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 709 (1936) (costs do not include "the general
expense of maintaining the system.of courts and the administration ofjustice'); United States
v. Murphy, 59 F.2d 734, 735 (S.D. Ala. 1932) (costs include expenses incurred obtaining
prosecution witness not called but which "under certain phases of the case could have become
very material"); State v. Hanson, 92 Idaho 665, 668, 448 P.2d 758, 761 (1968) (costs do not
include general expenses of court administration); Commonwealth v. Giacco, 202 Pa. Super.
Ct. 294, 196 A.2d 189, afd, 415 Pa. 139, 202 A.2d 55 (1964), rev'don othergrounds, 382 U.S. 399
(1966) (costs may be imposed on acquitted defendants). See also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569, 577 (1941); Maguire, Taing the Exercire of NaturalRights, in HARVARD LEGAL EsSAYS WRITTEN IN HONOR OF AND PRESENTED TO JOSEPH HENRY BEALE AND SAMUEL WIL-

LISTON 289 (1934). But see Krutz v. State, 4 Ind. 647 (1853) (incurred expenses may be
multiplied by number of counts to produce chargeable costs); State v. Smith, 184 N.C. 728,
114 S.E. 625 (1922) (statutory jury tax must be assessed even if defendant pleads guilty and
no jury impaneled).
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that end. That being done, the jury tax is an attempt to recoup some of
the expenses by charging the defendant. To call it a jury tax is not to
say that it pays for a jury, but that it is levied only upon those who
demand a jury. 154 Whatever the defendant pays goes into the state's
coffers, to be spent as the legislature sees fit. Insofar as the legislature
predicates its budget upon receipt of these funds, only decisions whether
to fund other activities might be affected. Regardless of the state's revenues, it is constitutionally obligated to provide a jury.
The jury tax in Wnght should have been struck down. At a minimum, an entitlement should be free from government surcharge. One
pays for the unusual, the extra, the exceptional-a constitutional right is
none of these. To be sure, one obtains the right to cross the Golden Gate
Bridge only by paying the toll, but that is because the state is under no
obligation to let anyone use the bridge at all. Since no constitutional
right is involved, the requirement of equal protection requires no more
of California than that it provide equal access, upon whatever terms it
chooses, to all who wish to cross.
Contrast Wnight with an hypothetical State v. Rong in which a defendant challenges the constitutionality of a statute which provides for a
three-dollar payment to every criminal defendant who waives his right
to a jury. In Rong, as in Wright, the defendant benefits financially by
waiving a jury. Yet in Rong the statute should be upheld. The challenge is based upon a claim to money to which the defendant is neither
entitled, nor would ever expect, as the government does not distribute
155
money for no reason.

The very act of paying someone not to exercise his constitutional
right makes the waiver exceptional. We expect to pay for services received and to be paid for services rendered. By providing a jury, the
state is merely doing what it must. By waiving a jury, a defendant is
doing what he need not, and what the government desires. If a state
believes that the benefits of a jury do not justify its expense, it should try
to save that expense by sharing the gain with those who will forego the
benefits, not by taxing those who demand them.
154 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943). But see State v. Smith, 184
N.C. 728, 114 S.E. 625.

155 One commentator has suggested that "it is at least arguable that state spending power
cannot be exercised to buy up rights guaranteed by the Constitution." Note, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1595, 1599 (1960). His justification is two-fold: (1) since no
societal interest is endangered by the exercise ofa defendant's rights, their exercise may not be
regulated; and (2) withholding a benefit from those who exercise a constitutional right "in
effect penalizes that exercise," id. As to his first point, a defendant's exercise of constitutional
rights consumes valuable state resources, and so this "buying up" program is a rational attempt to save money. The thrust of this article responds to his second point.
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LEGISLATIVE REFERENTS-SEPARATION OF POWERS AS A
PROCEDURAL PROTECTION

In UnitedStates v. Jackson,156 the Supreme Court invalidated the sentencing provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act because it excluded
from its capital punishment provision only those defendants who waived
their right to a jury trial. The Court held that the provision unnecessarily chilled a defendant's constitutional rights. As discussed above, that
rationalization would not have sufficed had the government argued that
the particular sentencing provision was enacted to encourage plea bargaining and waivers of jury trials. Such a defense was offered in the
substantially similar case of Corbilt v. New Jerseyq157
New Jersey law imposes a mandatory life sentence upon a defendant convicted of first degree murder while second degree murder is punished by not more than thirty years imprisonment. A defendant is never
charged with a specific degree of murder-if the jury convicts, its verdict
must include a finding of first or second degree murder. If a defendant
foregoes trial, the sentencing judge leaves unspecified the degree, and
imposes imprisonment for up to thirty years, or life.' 58 Corbitt was
charged with murder, pled not guilty, and was sentenced to mandatory
life imprisonment after a jury returned a finding of guilty in the first
degree.159
Corbitt argued that by demanding trial, he was forced to give up
the possibility of a sentence less than life because the circumstances underlying the government's case could have sustained a murder conviction only in the first degree.1 60 The effect of New Jersey's statutory
scheme was to give him either an opportunity to contest guilt or a
chance to benefit from the sentencing judge's mercy. Jackson condemned a statute that provided that one might get a harsher sentence
by going to trial; Corbitt was challenging a statute which offered the
possibility of a reduced sentence only to one who did not contest his
guilt. Corbitt argued that Jackson was controlling; a majority of the
Court disagreed. At this point, a schematic comparison of the Jackson
and Corbitt sentencing schemes will be helpful.
156 390 U.S. 570.
157 439 U.S. 212.
158 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:113-1, -2, -4 (West 1969), repealed, 1978 N.J. Laws ch. 95,
§ 2C:98-2 (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C: 11-2, -3 (West Supp. 1979)).
159 439 U.S. at 216.
160 Corbitt was indicted for both arson and murder. The state presented its case on a
felony murder theory and murder committed in perpetrating arson is defined to be in the first
degree. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 113-1 (West 1969), repealed, 1978 N.J. Laws ch. 95, § 2C:98-2
(current version. at NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West Supp. 1979)). See 439 U.S. at 216 n.4.
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AFTER TRIAL

Corbilt

30 to Life

Life

Jackson

Life

Life or Death

The similarity between Jackson and Corbitt is apparent. In each
case, a defendant is better off if he relinquishes his right to trial. At first
glance,Jacson lends strong support for the defendant's position in Corbitt.
The facts in Corbitt were indistinguishable from those in Jackson.
The government's litigating posture, however, was completely different.
While the Court in Corbitt correctly sensed the inadequacy of theJackson
rationale, it was plainly at a loss how to distinguish them. Moreover,
the Court could not distinguish the challenged practice from plea bargaining generally, and it was unwilling to condemn the latter whole16
sale. 1
The Jackson-Corbitt sentencing scheme is not "punishment" any
more than it is "reward." There is no a piori correct punishment befitting any crime or criminal. In the first instance and within broad limits,
setting the appropriate punishment for each crime is left to the various
legislatures.' 6 2 If the lesser sentence were the correct one inJacson or
Corbitt, the sentencing scheme would induce guilty pleas by punishing
those who demand trial. If the greater sentence were correct, then the
scheme would merely reward those who voluntarily forego trial. Because there is no correct sentence, there is no referent, and without that,
normative concepts cannot be defined.
The statutes inJackson and Corbiti should have been condemned
not because the legislatures chose wrong sentences, but because they refused to choose any. In Corbitt, any term of years from thirty to life
would have been constitutionally permissible. Had the New Jersey legislature specified forty-five years imprisonment, or life, or almost any
other penalty, it would have been unassailable. Instead, the legislature
conditioned a killer's just dessert on whether he demands a trial, and
that cannot be correct. The legislature or its delegate must sentence a
convicted defendant justly. While many individual factors may affect
that justice, the assertion or waiver of a constitutional right is not one of
63
them.
161 439 U.S. at 218-20.
162 Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133.
163 I am proposing that the only significant limitation upon a criminal sentence is a requirement of pure procedural justice.
iThere is no independent criterion for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair
procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that
the procedure has been properly followed. This situation is illustrated by gambling. If a
number of persons engage in a series of fair bets, the distribution of cash after the last bet
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Plea bargaining by anyone other than the body or individual responsible for setting sentence' 6 4 was not at issue. The duty of the legislature or the judge is to select the right sentence for each defendant
depending upon what he has done, and perhaps who he is.165 A prosecutor, in the interest of expediency rather than justice, may be willing to
"buy" a guilty plea for leniency. So long as the sentence is or will be set
by an independent body, the prosecutor has no power to punish, but can
only reward. The statute in Corbiet was not unconstitutional because it
encouraged plea bargaining, but because it represented legislative plea
bargaining.
Separating the power to create a referent from the power to bargain with it offers several benefits. First and foremost, it legitimizes the
substantive choice reflected in the referent. From taxes to traffic laws,
from quality of education to quality of beef, legislatures, executives, and
their delegates define our relationships, rights, and remedies. Courts review the validity of the various political decisions not so much by imposing their notions of correctness, but by ensuring that the processes by
which these decisions are made accord with our conception of representative democratic decisionmaking. One does not successfully challenge
a sale of state mineral rights as unwise, but as being the result of corruption. A court will much more likely enjoin a zoning variance if the challenge is based on conflict of interest rather than on arbitrariness.
is fair, or at least not unfair, whatever this distribution is. I assume . . . [t]he betting
procedure is fair and freely entered into under conditions that are fair. Thus the background circumstances define a fair procedure. Now any distribution of cash summing to
the initial stock held by all individuals could result from a series of fair bets. In this sense
all of these particular distributions are equally fair. A distinctive feature of pure procedural justice is that the procedure for determining the just result must actually be carried
out; for in these cases there is no independent criterion by reference to which a definite
outcome can be known to be just. Clearly we cannot say that a particular state of affairs
is just because it could have been reached by following a fair procedure. . . . What
makes the final outcome of betting fair, or not unfair, is that it is the one which has
arisen after a series of fair gambles. A fair procedure translates its fairness to the outcome only when it is actually carried out.
J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 14, at 86 (1971); see Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 351 (1973); Leventhal, EnvironmentalDecisionmakingand the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA.
L. REv. 509, 511 (1974). But see W. SEAGLE, LAW: THE SCIENCE OF INEFFICIENCY 13-14
(1952).
164 There have been direct attacks upon all plea bargaining. See, e.g., Unconstitutionality,
supra note 5. Most are based on the same misconception, namely that "[p]lea bargaining is
inherently destructive of the values of the trial process, for it is designed to prevent trials." Id.
at 1397-98. A defendant's probability of nonconviction is simply a reflection of the procedural protections available to all defendants as mirrored by the particular facts of a specific case.
Since a defendant's probability of nonconviction plays a substantial role in his plea negotiations, see S. BUCKLE & L. BUCKLE, BARGAINING FOR JUSTICE 121-26 (1977); M. HEUMANN,
supra note 17, at 106-07, the procedural protections filter down to the negotiating table and
are reflected in the eventual bargain struck by the parties.
165 See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-49 & nn.8-15 (1949); People v. Johnson, 252 N.Y. 387, 169 N.E. 619, 621 (1930).
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Plea bargaining is defensible so long as it can be placed within a
normative framework. That framework requires a referent, and it is up
to the legislature to define it or require judges to do so. A range of
sentences is arguably appropriate for any particular crime, and any
choice within that range should be upheld so long as there is no indication that the selection was influenced by improper factors. The correct
sentence is that which accords with the sentencer's sense ofjustice.166 If,
however, the sentencer is not disinterested, the sentence is suspect.
When the sentence is statutorily tied to a waiver of a constitutional
right, it cannot be correct even by this procedural definition. While the
executive may be willing to trade expediency for leniency, justice may
not.
To be sure, a legislator may vote for a sentence harsher than he
believes befits a certain crime, assuming that those eventually sentenced
for that crime will have committed a more serious offense which was
successfully negotiated down. Yet, such disingenuousness is unlikely.
One may not plea bargain because the prosecutor is unwilling, or because one is innocent. A defendant may be forced to go to trial because
the judge feels that a plea bargain is unfair to the state, 6 7 or to the
defendant. 168 Or, if a defendant has bargained down, one cannot determine how high he began, or whether he drove a hard or an easy bargain. In short, the innumerable factors causing a defendant to be
sentenced under a particular statute are beyond the ken of any legislator. A legislator knows too little to accurately step-up a criminal punishment.
Moreover, regardless of a legislator's or judge's expectations and assumptions, his public sentencing record will reveal actual crimes and
sentences. To the extent that he inflates criminal sentences, he may face
constituency pressure. Of course, acceptance by the voters of inflated
sentences would indicate that the legislator or judge had misconceived
the correct sentence in the first place.
In addition, legislative plea bargaining is done wholesale. A lesser
sentence is tied to a single characteristic (whether the defendant pleads
guilty), and is offered to all. Prosecutorial plea bargaining is done retail,
and can be tailored to each defendant. To a defendant whose guilt appears clear and whose trial will be short, little need or should be offered
for a plea of guilty. In an especially complicated case, a guilty plea
offers the state greater benefits, and so the state should be willing to offer
166 Se note 163 uipra.
167 See Note,JudidalDiscretion to Reject NegotiatedPleas, 63 GEo. LJ. 241 (1974).
168 United States v. Biscoe, 518 F.2d 95 (Ist Cir. 1975); United States v. Bednarski, 445
F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1971); Maxwell v. United States, 368 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1966); McCoy v.
United States, 363 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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more. The less individualized the plea bargaining, the more arbitrary it
becomes. Validating only prosecutorial plea bargaining helps ensure
that waivers of the right to trial are induced in a refined and rational
manner.
This examination of plea bargaining illustrates a broader point.
Systemic coercion is amenable to a normative analysis, and as long as
one decisionmaker creates the referent while another bargains with it,
systemic coercion is legitimate. If, however, there is no independent
referent, systemic coercion cannot be defended in normative terms. So
far, the courts have not articulated an alternate justification.
C.

EVERYDAY PRACTICE AS A TEST OF INVALIDITY

A standard can have critical content only for those whom it constrains. Anyone who can modify a standard is certainly unconstrained
by it. We cannot hope to prevent prosecutorial abuse by defining what
a prosecutor ought to do as what he currently does, for today's abuse
would become tomorrow's norm. It is the independent quality of the
referent which both legitimizes its correctness and reduces the likelihood
of improper motivation by eliminating the obvious conflict of interest.
There is no reason, however, why a decisionmaker's past practices
should not form a basis for invalidating systemic coercion. In North Carolina v. Pearce,169 the Court held that a defendant who successfully appealed his conviction and then was reconvicted could not be given an
increased sentence unless the reason f6r doing so appeared in the record
and was based upon facts occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. Justice White concurred in part and dissented in
part, writing: "I join the Court's opinion except that in my view Part IIC should authorize an increased sentence on retrial based on any objective, identifiable factual data not known to the trial judge at the time of
170
the original sentencing proceeding."'
When sentencing is left to the discretion of the trial judge, the correct sentence is by definition that which he believes is reasonable given
the facts as he knows them. A defendant is entitled to no more than the
judge's unbiased decision. Since the state has created the process by
which a defendant's proper sentence is determined, in the absence of
evidence that the process has broken down, the state should be bound
by that determination. Justice White's opinion embodies this theory:
the first sentence cannot be enhanced unless the process by which it was
chosen was faulty, the fault being an absence of relevant information.
When that information was developed is immaterial. If it was unknown
395 U.S. 711.
170 Id. at 751.
169
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to the original sentencing judge, the original sentence is tainted and the
process must begin again. If all the relevant data were known at the
first proceeding, the process cannot be challenged and its result is binding.
Even the majority opinion in Pearce can be read as embracing this
normative approach. The government should be estopped from
presenting facts at the resentencing which existed at the time of the original proceeding but were not then brought to light, because an adversary is generally bound by his mistakes. The majority opinion is
consistent with a normative approach because it binds the government
to the original sentence when the process which determined it was not
faulty and when the government is estopped to assert its faults. All this
is not to say that the Court consciously decided Pearce in these terms, but
only that as the Court's systemic coercion opinions are often clothed in
normative rhetoric, so too their decisions are animated by normative
concepts.
This brings us back to Bordenkircher v. Hayes. 17 1 Hayes involved
prosecutorial plea bargaining. The defendant was threatened with no
more than indictment for a crime for which he plainly was guilty and he
was sentenced to life as the Kentucky legislature statutorily had fixed. It
appears to be the paradigmatic permissible systemic coercion. Nevertheless, the Court's decision brought widespread criticism, and in fact
was wrong.
What causes such a violent reaction to Hayes is that the defendant
was sentenced to life imprisonment for committing three petty offenses.
The visceral unacceptability of the Hayes situation is not that the prosecutor drove such a hard bargain, but that he had power to drive such an
extreme bargain at all. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has ruied that
if a legislature wants to send a petty recidivist to prison for life, neither
the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
72
nor any other part of the Constitution stands in the way.1
The problem in Hayes was that the Kentucky legislature did not
make that decision. To be sure, the legislature validly enacted a statute
which authorizes life sentences for third-time offenders. But it did not
intend that statute to be rigorously, or even commonly, applied. Despite
the almost total absence of marginal cost, the enforcement of habitual
criminal statutes is rare. 173 These statutes are characterized by indefen171 434 U.S. 357.
172 Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133.
173 Brown, The Treatment of the Reddivist in the United States, 23 CAN. B. REV. 640, 659
(1945); see Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 454-56 (1962). See general4' Note, 16 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 275, 277 n.4 (1979).
Because serious crimes carry their own severe penalties, the harsh sentences meted out by
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If they were taken seri-

ously by prosecutors and judges, they might vanish. But they are not.
Legislators enact these extreme statutes knowing that they will be en-

forced only sporadically, thereby shifting sentencing decisions from high
visibility legislative debate to low visibility prosecutorial discretion.1 75
Defendant Hayes was denied a constitutional right, the right to
have the legislature or an independent judge set his sentence. He was
denied procedural due process, because the law under which he was sentenced was a sham. He was denied the cleansing effect of legislative
decisionmaking because the legislators knew that the statute would be

rarely enforced. Unless legislators are forced to take their lawmaking
seriously, they may legislate arbitrarily. 176 The prosecutor in Hayes did
nothing wrong; the Kentucky legislature did. Plea bargaining is valid so
long as the prosecutor's discretion is bound by what the legislature, or its
independent surrogate, thejudge, believes is reasonable. In Hayes, it was
not, and so the habitual criminal conviction should have been reversed.
D.

BEYOND A NORMATIVE THEORY

This normative theory does not resolve every systemic coercion
case. The issue posed by McAulfi v. New Bedford, Garty v. New Jersey,
and Gardner v. Broderick can only uncomfortably be forced into its
mold. 77 Whenever systemic coercion is rational but uncompelling,
when there exists no omnipresent referent and there is no reasonable
way to apply a separation of powers doctrine, it is not clear how a court
should resolve the case. A complete answer to the systemic coercion
problem I leave for another day. I have, I believe, provided a coherent
framework for analyzing many of the systemic coercion cases.

recidivist statutes primarily fall upon the shoulders of petty criminals. Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws.- A Reconsideration, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 99, 106 (1971).
174 Katkin, supra note 173, at 105 & n.32.
175 Prosecutorial discretion has been characterized as "the broadest discretionary power in
criminal administration." Vorenberg, supra note 17, at 678 (footnote omitted). It is subject to
minimal judicial review. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); see Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614 (1973).
176 See People v. Anaya, 194 Colo. 345, 347-52, 572 P.2d 153, 155-58 (1977) (Carrigan, J.,
dissenting); State v. Cory, 204 Or. 235, 282 P.2d 1054 (1955); Note, Court Treatment of General
Recidivist Statutes, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 238, 252 & n.121 (1948). See also A. BICKEL, supra note
139, at 148-56 (concept of dissuetude).
177 At first glance, a private industry standard seems to be the appropriate referent in these
cases. However, two problems exist: there frequently is no job in the private sector analogous
to that in the public sector, and even if there is one, it is not clothed with the public interest,
arguably an essential consideration. The strictures of the Constitution weigh more heavily
upon the shoulders of the government than upon private employers, suggesting that a private
industry standard could at best function only as a test for invalidation.

